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INTRODUCTION 
On January 22, 2009, shortly after he assumed office, President Barack 
Obama issued an executive order closing the United States military deten-
tion facility at Guantanamo Bay and halting the military commissions that 
were then underway.1  The order called for a committee to review whether 
and how Guantanamo Bay detainees should be prosecuted.2  However, de-
tailed procedures for prosecuting Guantanamo detainees already existed 
and, in fact, trials were already underway in Guantanamo Bay.   
After President Obama issued the January 22nd Executive Order halting 
military trials, most judges and prosecutors in Guantanamo Bay complied 
despite the fact that  no law, including the Military Commissions Act of 
2006 and the Manual for Military Commissions, gives any President the 
power to order prosecutors to ask for, or order a judge to grant, a conti-
  
 * Kyndra Rotunda is a Lecturer at Berkeley Law School; Visiting Assistant 
Professor of Law and Director of the Military Personnel Law Center & AMVETS Legal 
Clinic at Chapman University School of Law; Former Army JAG Corps Officer [Major]; and 
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Terror, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 449 (2009) [hereinafter Rotunda].  
 1. Exec. Order No. 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009). 
 2. Id. § 4(c)(3):  
Determination of Prosecution.  In accordance with United States law, 
the cases of individuals detained at Guantánamo not approved for 
release or transfer shall be evaluated to determine whether the 
Federal Government should seek to prosecute the detained 
individuals for any offenses they may have committed, including 
whether it is feasible to prosecute such individuals before a court 
established pursuant to Article III of the United States Constitution, 
and the Review participants shall in turn take the necessary and 
appropriate steps based on such determinations.  Id.   
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nuance.3  Nonetheless, prosecutors filed motions to stop the trials, and 
judges granted them.  There was one lone exception.4   
Army Colonel James Pohl, who was presiding over the prosecution of 
Abd al–Rahim al–Nashiri (the alleged mastermind of the U.S.S. Cole bomb-
ing in 2000), refused to stop the trial.5  Colonel Pohl said that the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 governed the proceedings, and stated, “[t]he pub-
lic interest in a speedy trial will be harmed by the delay in the arraign-
ment.”6  Colonel Pohl also stated, “[t]he Commission is bound by the law as 
it currently exists not as it may change in the future.”7  Colonel Pohl pointed 
out that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 gave the military judges 
“sole authority” to grant delays once charges had been referred for trial.8 
On the heels of Colonel Pohl’s refusal, the Pentagon issued a statement.  
Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said that “Pohl would soon be told to 
comply with Obama’s executive order.”9  He went on to explain, “all I can 
really tell you is that this department will be in full compliance with the 
President’s executive order.  There’s no if, ands or buts about that [sic].”10  
He then added, “while that executive order is in force and effect, trust me 
that there will be no proceedings continuing, down at Gitmo, with Military 
Commissions.”11  As predicted, a few days later, the charges against al–
Nashiri were dropped.12  Colonel Pohl—the presiding judge—was not in-
volved in that decision.13  
This Article examines President Obama’s decision to unilaterally halt 
military trials and analyzes that decision in the context of applicable law, 
including the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and the Manual for Mili-
tary Commissions.  It also discusses and analyzes the law prohibiting un-
lawful command influence and ultimately concludes that President Obama’s 
decision to halt Guantanamo trials, over the objection of the presiding mili-
tary judge (Colonel Pohl), may have violated governing law and may have 
  
 3. Carol J. Williams, Guantanamo Judge Says He’s Forging Ahead; He Defies 
Obama’s Request to Suspend Tribunal Proceedings, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2009, at A9. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id.; see also Military Judge Refuses to Halt Trial of USS Cole Bombing Suspect, 
FOX NEWS (Jan. 29, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/01/29/military-judge-
refuses-halt-trial-uss-cole-bombing-suspect. 
 6. Ruling on Government Motion to Continue Arraignment, United States v. Al–
Nashiri, (Jan. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2009/DelayArraignment_MJ.pdf.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Williams, supra note 3.  
 9. Id. 
 10. Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of Defense News Briefing 
(Jan. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4345. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Charges Dropped in USS Cole Terror Trial, MSNBC (Feb. 5, 2009), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29042139. 
 13. Id. 
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amounted to unlawful command influence.     
I.   LAW GOVERNING MILITARY COMMISSIONS & UNLAWFUL COMMAND 
INFLUENCE 
Military commissions were not then, and are not now, a creature of the 
Executive Branch.14      They exist in accordance with a federal statute—an 
act of Congress—entitled the Military Commissions Act of 2006.15  The 
trials are also governed by detailed rules contained in the Manual for Mili-
tary Commissions.16  These provisions together establish procedures for 
conducting military commissions.  They also include important restrictions 
on power.17  For instance, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 specifies 
that only presiding judges have authority to grant delays18  and the Manual 
for Military Commissions makes it illegal for any official to improperly 
influence the action of a military commission (or, to put it another way, it 
prohibits what the military calls “unlawful command influence”). 
Because meddling commanders threaten the independence of military tri-
als, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) makes command influ-
ence illegal.19  It is a punishable crime, and (among other things) prohibits 
any commander from influencing an action of any military tribunal.20  This 
protects military trials and helps to ensure that jurors and judges are objec-
tive and make decisions based only on evidence admitted at the trial, and 
not on the perceived, or expressed, desires of any chain of command. 
Congress included the same prohibition in the recently enacted Rules for 
Military Commissions.  Under these rules, it is unlawful for any official to 
improperly influence the action of military commissions in the global War 
on Terror.21  In fact, the Military Commissions Rule is actually more broad 
than the Courts Martial Rule because it covers “all persons” and specifies 
that “no person may attempt” to unlawfully, or by unauthorized means, in-
fluence the military commission.22  The Courts Martial Rule only applies to 
  
 14. For further discussion and analysis of Military Commissions, see Rotunda, supra 
note 1.  Portions of this piece were adapted from that article. 
 15. Pub. L. No. 109–366, 120 Stat. 2600. 
 16. See RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, 
available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/The%20Manual%20for%20Military%20Commissions
.pdf. [hereinafter RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS].  
 17. See Military Commissions Act of 2006. 
 18. Id. § 949(e); see also Ruling on Government Motion to Continue Arraignment, 
supra note 7. 
 19. See RULES FOR COURTS MARTIAL, MANUAL FOR COURTS–MARTIAL, pt. II, ch. I, 
R. 104, at II–4 (2008). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See RULES FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, supra note 17, pt. II, ch. I, R. 104, at II–
8 (2007). 
 22. Id. pt. II, ch. I, R. 104(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
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“all persons subject to the code.”23  This expansion is important because it 
means that civilians and non–active duty members (those not ordinarily 
subject to the code) are prohibited from influencing military commissions.  
It suggests that Congress was particularly concerned with preserving the 
integrity and independence of the military commission process.    
Courts consistently recognize the deleterious impact of unlawful com-
mand influence on military trials.  One court called it the “mortal enemy of 
military justice.”24  Another referred to it as “a malignancy that eats away at 
the fairness of our military justice system.”25  Military courts have inter-
preted the crime of unlawful command influence to include even the ap-
pearance of unlawful command influence.26   
But what conduct falls within the realm of unlawful command influence?  
Where is the line?  While no bright line exists, tests include “whether a rea-
sonable member of the public . . . would have a loss of confidence in the 
military justice system and believe it to be unfair.”27  Another test asks 
whether the command influence placed “intolerable strain on public percep-
tion of the military justice system.”28  Figuratively and generally speaking, 
the test for unlawful command influence asks whether the Commander was 
“brought into the deliberation room”—whether he controlled the trial or the 
court.29 
Military courts have repeatedly held that almost any interference with 
military trials amounts to unlawful command influence.  For instance, one 
court found that a hospital commander committed unlawful command influ-
ence when he generally criticized witnesses (after the trial was over) for 
testifying on behalf of alleged drug offenders.30  Even when his statements 
could not have possibly impacted the outcome of a trial—a trial that was 
over—the court, in an abundance of caution, nonetheless found that unlaw-
ful command influence existed.   
Another court held that an Army General committed unlawful command 
influence when he advised subordinate officers against recommending a bad 
conduct discharge for a soldier, only to then testify at the sentencing phase 
that the same convicted soldier was a “good soldier.”31  The General be-
lieved, understandably, that the two positions were inconsistent.  The court 
found that unlawful command influence existed.  It said, “in this area [un-
  
 23. Id. 
 24. Teresa K. Hollingsworth, Unlawful Command Influence, 39 A.F. L. REV. 261, 
263 (1996) (citing United States v. Thomas, 22 M.J. 388, 394 (C.M.A. 1986)). 
 25. Id. (citing United States v. Gleason, 39 M.J. 776, 782 (A.C.M.R. 1994)). 
 26. Id. at 264–65 (citing United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 590 (N-M.C.M.R. 
1990)). 
 27. United States v. Allen, 31 M.J. 572, 590 (N-M.C.M.R. 1990). 
 28. United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 374 (C.A.A.F. 2003). 
 29. Allen, 31 M.J. at 590 (quoting United States v. Grady, 15 M.J. 275 (C.M.A. 
1983). 
 30. United States v. Sullivan, 26 M.J. 442 (CMA 1988). 
 31. United States v. Treakle, 18 M.J. 646 (A.C.M.R. 1984). 
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lawful command influence] the band of permissible activity by the com-
mander is narrow, and the risks of overstepping its boundaries are great.  
Interference with the discretionary functions of subordinates is particularly 
hazardous.”32  In this case, the court erred on the side of preserving discre-
tionary functions, even when those functions were carried out in an incon-
sistent (and possibly unjust) manner.    
In another rather curious case, a court held that an informal inquiry into 
suspected unlawful command influence could itself amount to unlawful 
command influence.  After a military judge ruled leniently in three cases, a 
group of senior military lawyers (including the Judge Advocate General of 
the Air Force), opened an informal inquiry into whether the judge had been 
subjected to unlawful command influence by his chain of command.  The 
U.S. Court of Military Appeals barred such inquiries and said that only offi-
cial investigations “made by an independent judicial Commission estab-
lished in strict accordance with the guidance contained in Section 9.1(a) of 
the AGA Standards . . . ” were permitted.33  The court was concerned that 
the inquiry itself could amount to unlawful command influence.34 It is un-
clear how an investigation aimed at uncovering possible unlawful command 
influence might itself amount to unlawful command influence.  However, 
the court, in a skittish attempt to steer far away from even the appearance of 
unlawful command influence, barred the JAG Officers from asking ques-
tions designed to stop unlawful command influence.   
The above are but a few examples of conduct that military courts consid-
er unlawful command influence.  These cases illustrate that military courts 
are consistently aggressive about protecting the integrity of military trials 
and that they have a propensity to find that almost any interference with 
military trials amounts to unlawful command influence.    
This general propensity is sharpened when the interference threatens the 
integrity of sitting judges.  A recent case, United States v.  Lewis,35 demon-
strates that military courts are particularly protective of judicial decision–
making. The holding in Lewis is instructive in analyzing President Obama’s 
decisions with respect to trials underway in Guantanamo Bay. 
II.   UNLAWFUL COMMAND INFLUENCE AND SITTING JUDGES:  THE 
APPLICABILITY OF U.S. V. LEWIS 
In United States v. Lewis,36 a military prosecutor and his supervising law-
yer (the Staff Judge Advocate, or “SJA”) aggressively sought to have a Ma-
rine Corps Judge recuse herself on the grounds that the judge had a personal 
  
 32. Id. at 653. 
 33. United States v. Ledbetter, 2 M.J. 37, 43 (C.M.A. 1976). 
 34. Id.  
 35. See 63 M.J. 405 (C.A.A.F. 2006). 
 36. Id. at 407–08. 
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relationship with the defendant’s lawyer (who was a former Marine).  The 
prosecutor alleged that the judge and civilian defense counsel had interacted 
socially, even while the trial was ongoing.37   
The prosecutor introduced evidence that the military judge and defense 
counsel were seen together at a play while the trial was underway.38  When 
initially questioned about attending the play with the defense counsel, the 
judge failed to disclose that interaction.  Later, she explained that it had 
“slipped [her] mind.”39  She then conceded that she and the defense counsel 
had “occasional social interaction with no discussions of any military trials 
pending before me.”40 
In addition to the social relationship, the prosecutor also pointed out that 
the defense counsel had a practice of sending copies of e–mails about pend-
ing cases to this particular judge and that the defense counsel had previously 
expressed a preference for this military judge in other cases.41 
The prosecutor also introduced evidence that the judge had been voir di-
red about her personal relationship with defense counsel in several other 
cases.42  In one instance, after being voir dired by the prosecutor in an earli-
er case, the judge told a colleague that she felt she had been put “through an 
inquisition” and that “it would take . . . a few days to get back on good 
terms with the government.”43  The prosecutor introduced this prior state-
ment as evidence of partiality toward this particular defense counsel.44 
  
 37. Id. at 408. 
 38. Id. at 409. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Lewis, 63 M.J. at 408–09. 
 42. Id. at 409. 
 43. Id. at 408. 
 44. Id. at 408–09. The prosecution’s motion for recusal went as follows: 
Ma’am, at this time taken all of the facts that have come to light 
during this inquiry, your previous involvement with the companion 
cases, having worked with Colonel [JS] in the past, having a social 
relationship limited to interactions at the barn, as well as the fact 
that defense counsel in the Neff case apparently received statements 
from the assistant civilian defense counsel expressing preference for 
you as military judge, also the fact that you expressed in the 
Scamahorn case displeasure with the way that you had been voir 
dired in the Curiel case; also the fact that civilian defense counsel in 
this case has made a habit of CC’ing you on electronic mail 
messages which contained disputed and contested substantial issues 
relating to suborning perjury, discovery issue, and making 
recommendations to you as to what would be an appropriate 
resolution for failure to comply with pretrial milestones: All of that 
taken together, ma’am, would you agree that creates an appearance 
of impartiality [sic] that a reasonable person might perceive with 
respect to this case, ma’am?  
Id. 
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The military judge at first denied the prosecution’s motion to recuse.  The 
prosecutor sought a three day continuance to determine whether the gov-
ernment would appeal the ruling.  The judge denied that request.  The pros-
ecutor then amended the request and asked for only a three hour conti-
nuance in order to seek a stay of the proceedings.  The judge denied that 
request, too.45 
Ultimately, after consulting with other judges in the circuit, the judge 
changed her mind and recused herself.46  She stated, “I’m emotional about 
this,”47 and explained that she was “mortally disappointed in the profession-
al community that is willing to draw such slanderous conclusions from so 
little information.”48  She went on to explain, “I now find myself second 
guessing every decision in this case.  Did I favor the government to protect 
myself from further assault?  Did I favor the accused to retaliate against the 
government[?]”49  She held prosecutors responsible for her inability to be 
objective, stating, “my emotional reaction to the slanderous conduct of the 
SJA has invaded my deliberative process on the motions.”50 
After the sitting judge recused herself, the military assigned a new judge, 
LTC FD.51  Incredibly, he accepted the case only to almost immediately 
recuse himself, too.  What were his reasons for recusal?  “The manner in 
which [trial counsel] handled the voir dire in this case particularly offends 
me.”52  He characterized the SJA’s voir dire of the former judge as a “crass, 
sarcastic, and scurrilous characterization of the social interaction between 
Major [CW] and Ms. [JS] . . . .”53  He explained that he could “neither un-
derstand nor set aside” the “ignorance, prejudice, and paranoia on the part 
of the government . . . .”54 
But how, exactly, did the diligent voir dire of a former judge prejudice 
the present judge?  It seems that the military judges mounted a united, pub-
lic front against voir dire directed at them.  One can only understand this as 
a warning to JAG prosecutors that judges are off limits.  Arguably, it is this 
united front that taints the fairness of military trials—not prosecutors doing 
their jobs. 
Although the case seems more about judicial recusal than unlawful com-
mand influence, it morphed into a case resting on principles of unlawful 
command influence.  On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces held that the prosecutor and the SJA’s diligent attempts to recuse the 
  
 45. Id. at 409. 
 46. Id. at 411. 
 47. Lewis, 63 M.J. 410. 
 48. Id. at 410–11. 
 49. Id. at 411. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Lewis, 63 M.J. 411. 
 54. Id. 
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judge amounted to unlawful command influence.55  Without citing any evi-
dence that the prosecutor or SJA were actually influenced by their chain of 
command, or that they acted out of anything but professional diligence, the 
Court of Appeals found unlawful command influence.  It said: 
 
[t]o the extent that the SJA, a representative of the conven-
ing authority, advised the trial counsel in the voir dire as-
sault on the military judge and to the extent that his unpro-
fessional behavior as a witness and inflammatory testimony 
created a bias in the military judge, the facts establish clear-
ly that there was unlawful command influence on the court–
martial.56 
That is, the Court simply held that if the prosecutors acted as puppets for 
the command then unlawful command influence occurred.  But that is noth-
ing new under the sun.  The Court failed to answer the dispositive question 
of whether the commander was at all involved.  And, if he was, did that 
involvement rise to the level of unlawful command influence?   
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces agreed with the lower court, 
also without citing any evidence that the prosecutors were motivated by any 
commander.  It simply held that “a reasonable observer would have signifi-
cant doubt about the fairness of this court–martial in light of the Govern-
ment’s conduct with respect to MAJ CW [the military judge].”57  It did not 
explain why a reasonable observer would reach such a conclusion. 
It is unclear how a prosecutor aggressively seeking to have a judge recuse 
herself, whom the prosecutor reasonably believed was biased, amounts to 
unlawful command influence.  How would it lead one to believe that the 
procedures were not fair?  In fact, the opposite is true.  One would think that 
a military prosecutor facing off against a military judge in open court de-
monstrates that the proceedings are fair; that they are not orchestrated; that 
both prosecutors and defense counsel diligently represent their clients, de-
spite the fact that they all work for the military. 
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the holding in Lewis, one cannot 
deny the fact that its holding would prohibit President Obama—or any pres-
ident—from stopping military trials already underway.  If minor interfe-
rences with a trial by a prosecutor amounts to unlawful command influence, 
then surely a President halting a trial altogether qualifies as well.  If the 
mere theoretical possibility that a commander encouraged a prosecutor to 
recuse a judge amounts to unlawful interference, then certainly a President 
actually halting a trial and involuntarily removing the judge qualifies as 
well.  Is there any greater “interference” than ordering a judge to stop a tri-
  
 55. Id. at 414–15. 
 56. Id. at 412 (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. at 415. 
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al? 
Ironically, one of the sitting judges, Judge Susan Crawford, who decided 
the Lewis case,58 later yielded to and even facilitated President Obama’s 
order to halt military commissions that were already underway in Guanta-
namo Bay.  Only a few months after Lewis, Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
designated Judge Crawford as the convening authority for military commis-
sions.59  Her position as the convening authority meant that she would su-
pervise the office of Military Commissions, review and approve charges, 
and appoint members of the military commission, along with other duties.60 
When Colonel Pohl would not yield to President Obama’s order to halt 
the trials, Judge Crawford intervened and dismissed the charges against al–
Nashiri, who was the alleged mastermind of the U.S.S. Cole bombing.61  
The case was not before her. 
The same Pentagon official who said approximately one week before the 
dismissal that “Pohl would soon be told to comply”62 confirmed that Craw-
ford yielded to the President’s order.  He stated, “[i]t was her decision, but it 
reflects the fact that the [P]resident had issued an executive order which 
mandates that the commissions be halted . . . .”63  On the heels of her deci-
sion in Lewis, in which she took a rigid stand against unlawful command 
influence with relatively weak facts, Crawford yielded to President Ob-
ama’s order to halt military trials.64 
That is, the same Judge who believes that diligent voir dire directed at 
military judges amounts to unlawful command influence, holds different 
and inconsistent views when the command influence originates with a sit-
ting President.  The precise reason for the inconsistency is unclear.   
However, one reasonable explanation for the inconsistency is that per-
haps Judge Crawford herself was a victim of unlawful command influence.  
That is, perhaps she can identify unlawful command influence, but she can-
not resist it when the order comes from the highest commander—the Presi-
dent and commander in chief.  Indeed, that is why the military prohibits 
unlawful command influence, and defines it broadly. 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,65 the Supreme Court criticized President Bush 
for changing the rules governing military commissions after the trials were 
already underway.  It said that changing the rules “at the whim of the Ex-
  
 58. Id. at 406; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Seasoned Judge 
Tapped to Head Detainee Trials (Feb. 7, 2007), 
www.defenselink.mil/REleases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID=10493. 
 59. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, supra note 56. 
 60. Id. 
 61. MSNBC, supra note 12. 
 62. Williams, supra note 3. 
 63. MSNBC, supra note 12. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 548 U.S. at 633 n. 65 (2006). 
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ecutive” was “irregular.”66  Surely, if the Supreme Court thinks that chang-
ing the rules mid–trial is unfair, it would also conclude that halting the trials 
all together in violation of a governing federal statute is also unfair. 
Arguably, the Pentagon orders did not merely bring President Obama “in-
to the deliberation room.” Instead, they allowed the President to figuratively 
block the deliberation room door by stopping a trial that was already un-
derway and removing the presiding judge.   Importantly, the Executive Or-
der and the Pentagon’s statements responding to Colonel Pohl’s refusal to 
stop the trial left no room for Colonel Pohl to exercise judicial discretion or 
to issue rulings in a case before him.  This interference undermined the in-
tegrity of the judicial system and is arguably the reason why the military has 
laws prohibiting unlawful command influence.  In this case, the President 
arguably substituted his judgment for that of a sitting judge.   
III.   CONCLUSION 
In the Global War on Terror, President Obama halted military commis-
sions in violation of the Military Commissions Act, and possibly in viola-
tion of the prohibition against unlawful command influence.  Executive 
interference with military trials undermines their legitimacy and cuts against 
the existence of procedural protections. What good are procedural protec-
tions if the Executive, acting alone, can undo them?  What good are inde-
pendent judges when a President can unseat them or order cases before 
them to be dismissed? 
What, if any, impact President Obama’s decision will have on the overall 
integrity of military commissions remains to be seen.  President Obama, in 
concert with Attorney General Eric Holder, ultimately decided that some 
detainees would face trial before Article III (civilian) courts, while others 
would face trial by military commission in Guantanamo Bay.  Presently, no 
lawyer has raised a complaint of unlawful command influence.  However, if 
and when military trials resume, lawyers could raise the complaint at that 
time.  Would a court curtail unlawful command influence with military 
commissions when a sitting President is involved?  Would it maintain its 
current rigid stance against unlawful command influence?  Perhaps, but we 
cannot know for sure.  One thing is clear: only time will tell whether the 
President’s involvement in military commissions is for better or for worse; 
or whether it will ultimately be regarded as unlawful command influence 
and presidential error.  
 
  
 66. Id.  
